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Risk-Sensitive Learning and Pricing for Demand Response
Kia Khezeli Eilyan Bitar
Abstract—We consider the setting in which an electric power
utility seeks to curtail its peak electricity demand by offering
a fixed group of customers a uniform price for reductions in
consumption relative to their predetermined baselines. The un-
derlying demand curve, which describes the aggregate reduction
in consumption in response to the offered price, is assumed to be
affine and subject to unobservable random shocks. Assuming that
both the parameters of the demand curve and the distribution
of the random shocks are initially unknown to the utility, we
investigate the extent to which the utility might dynamically
adjust its offered prices to maximize its cumulative risk-sensitive
payoff over a finite number of T days. In order to do so
effectively, the utility must design its pricing policy to balance the
tradeoff between the need to learn the unknown demand model
(exploration) and maximize its payoff (exploitation) over time.
In this paper, we propose such a pricing policy, which is shown
to exhibit an expected payoff loss over T days that is at most
O(
√
T log(T )), relative to an oracle pricing policy that knows
the underlying demand model. Moreover, the proposed pricing
policy is shown to yield a sequence of prices that converge to the
oracle optimal prices in the mean square sense.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to implement residential demand response (DR)
programs at scale has the potential to substantially improve
the efficiency and reliability of electric power systems. In the
following paper, we consider a class of DR programs in which
an electric power utility seeks to elicit a reduction in the
aggregate electricity demand of a fixed group of customers,
during peak demand periods. The class of DR programs we
consider rely on non-discriminatory, price-based incentives for
demand reduction. That is to say, each participating customer
is remunerated for her reduction in electricity demand accord-
ing to a uniform price determined by the utility.
There are several challenges a utility faces in implementing
such programs, the most basic of which is the prediction of
how customers will adjust their aggregate demand in response
to different prices – the so-called aggregate demand curve. The
extent to which customers are willing to forego consumption,
in exchange for monetary compensation, is contingent on
variety of idiosyncratic and stochastic factors – the majority
of which are initially unknown or not directly measurable
by the utility. The utility must, therefore, endeavor to learn
the behavior of customers over time through observation of
aggregate demand reductions in response to its offered prices
for DR. At the same time, the utility must set its prices for DR
in such a manner as to promote increased earnings over time.
As we will later establish, such tasks are inextricably linked,
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and give rise to a trade-off between learning (exploration) and
earning (exploitation) in pricing demand response over time.
Contribution and Related Work: We consider the setting in
which the electric power utility is faced with a demand curve
that is affine in price, and subject to unobservable, additive
random shocks. Assuming that both the parameters of the
demand curve and the distribution of the random shocks are
initially unknown to the utility, we investigate the extent to
which the utility might dynamically adjust its offered prices for
demand curtailment to maximize its cumulative risk-sensitive
payoff over a finite number of T days. We define the utility’s
payoff on any given day as the largest return the utility is
guaranteed to receive with probability no less than 1−α. Here,
α ∈ (0, 1) encodes the utility’s sensitivity to risk. In this paper,
we propose a causal pricing policy, which resolves the trade-
off between the utility’s need to learn the underlying demand
model and maximize its cumulative risk-sensitive payoff over
time. More specifically, the proposed pricing policy is shown
to exhibit an expected payoff loss over T days – relative to an
oracle that knows the underlying demand model – which is at
most O(
√
T log(T )). Moreover, the proposed pricing policy is
shown to yield a sequence of offered prices, which converges
to the sequence of oracle optimal prices in the mean square
sense.
There is a related stream of literature in operations re-
search and adaptive control [1]–[5], which considers a similar
setting in which a monopolist endeavors to sell a product
over multiple time periods – with the aim of maximizing its
cumulative expected revenue – when the underlying demand
curve (for that product) is unknown and subject to exogenous
shocks. What distinguishes our formulation from this prevail-
ing literature is the explicit treatment of risk-sensitivity in the
optimization criterion we consider, and the subsequent need
to design pricing policies that not only learn the underlying
demand curve, but also learn the shock distribution.
Focusing explicitly on demand response applications, there
are several related papers in the literature, which formulate the
problem of eliciting demand response under uncertainty within
the framework of multi-armed bandits [6]–[9]. In this setting,
each arm represents a customer or a class of customers. Taylor
and Mathieu [6] show that, in the absence of exogenous shocks
on load curtailment, the optimal policy is indexable. Kalathil
and Rajagopal [7] consider a similar multi-armed bandit
setting in which a customer’s load curtailment is subject to an
exogenous shock, and attenuation due to fatigue resulting from
repeated requests for reduction in demand over time. They
propose a policy, which guarantees that the T -period regret
is bounded from above by O(
√
T logT ). There is a related
stream of literature, which treats the problem of pricing de-
mand response under uncertainty using techniques from online
learning [10]–[13]. Perhaps closest to the setting considered
2in this paper, Jia et al. [11] consider the problem of pricing
demand response when the underlying demand function is
unknown, affine, and subject to normally distributed random
shocks. With the aim of maximizing the utility’s expected
surplus, they propose a stochastic approximation-based pricing
policy, and establish an upper bound on the T -period regret
that is of the order O(log T ). There is another stream of
literature, which considers an auction-based approach to the
procurement of demand response [14]–[20]. In such settings,
the primary instrument for analysis is game-theoretic in nature.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we develop the demand model and formulate the
utility’s pricing problem for demand response. In Section III,
we outline a scheme for demand model learning. In Section
IV, we propose a pricing policy and analyze its performance.
We investigate the behavior of the proposed pricing policy
with a numerical case study in Section VI. All mathematical
proofs are presented in the Appendix to the paper.
II. MODEL
A. Responsive Demand Model
We consider a class of demand response (DR) programs in
which an electric power utility seeks to elicit a reduction in
peak electricity demand from a fixed group of N customers
over multiple time periods (e.g., days) indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . .
The class of DR programs we consider rely on uniform price-
based incentives for demand reduction.1 Specifically, prior to
each time period t, the utility broadcasts a single price pt ≥ 0
($/kWh), to which each participating customer i responds with
a reduction in demand Dit (kWh) – thus entitling customer i
to receive a payment in the amount of ptDit.
2
We model the response of each customer i to the posted
price pt at time t according to a linear demand function given
by
Dit = aipt + bi + εit, for i = 1, . . . , N,
where ai ∈ R and bi ∈ R are model parameters unknown to
the utility, and εit is an unobservable demand shock, which we
model as a random variable with zero mean.3 Its distribution is
also unknown to the utility. We define the aggregate response
of customers at time t as Dt :=
∑N
i=1Dit, which satisfies
Dt = apt + b+ εt. (1)
Here, the aggregate model parameters and shock are defined as
a :=
∑N
i=1 ai, b :=
∑N
i=1 bi, and εt :=
∑N
i=1 εit. To simplify
notation in the sequel, we write the deterministic component
of aggregate demand as λ(p, θ) := ap+ b, where θ := (a, b)
denotes the aggregate demand function parameters.
1This class of DR programs falls within the more general category of
programs that rely on peak time rebates (PTR) as incentives for demand
reduction [21].
2A customer’s reduction in demand is measured against a predetermined
baseline. The question as to how such baselines might be reliably inferred is
a challenging and active area of research [22]–[26]. Expanding our model to
make endogenous the calculation of customer baselines is left as a direction
for future research.
3We note that the assumption that εit be zero-mean is without loss of
generality.
We assume throughout the paper that a ∈ [a, a] and
b ∈ [0, b], where the model parameter bounds are assumed
to be known and satisfy 0 < a ≤ a < ∞ and 0 ≤ b < ∞.
Such assumptions are natural, as they ensure that the price
elasticity of aggregate demand is strictly positive and bounded,
and that reductions in aggregate demand are guaranteed to
be nonnegative in the absence of demand shocks. We also
assume that the sequence of shocks {εt} are independent and
identically distributed random variables, in addition to the
following technical assumption.
Assumption 1. The aggregate demand shock εt has a bounded
range [ε, ε], and a cumulative distribution function F , which
is bi-Lipschitz over this range. Namely, there exists a real
constant L ≥ 1, such that for all x, y ∈ [ε, ε], it holds that
1
L
|x− y| ≤ |F (x)− F (y)| ≤ L |x− y| .
There is a large family of distributions respecting As-
sumption 1 including uniform and doubly truncated normal
distributions. Moreover, the assumption that the aggregate
demand shock takes bounded values is natural, given the
inherent physical limitation on the range of values that demand
can take. And, technically speaking, the requirement that F
be bi-Lipschitz is stated to ensure Lipschitz continuity of its
inverse, which will prove critical to the derivation of our main
results. Finally, we note that the electric power utility need not
know the parameters specified in Assumption 1, beyond the
assumption of their boundedness.
Remark 1 (On the Linearity Assumption). While the as-
sumption of linearity in the underlying demand model might
appear restrictive at first glance, there are several sensible
arguments in support of its adoption. First, the assumption of
linearity is routinely employed in the revenue management and
pricing literature [3], [11], [27]–[30], as it serves to facilitate
theoretical analyses, thereby bringing to light key features of
the problem and its solution structure. More practically, if
the range of allowable prices is sufficiently limited, then it is
reasonable to assume that the underlying (possibly nonlinear)
demand function is well approximated by an affine function
over that range. And, in the specific context of pricing for DR
programs, it is reasonable to expect that the electric power
utility, being a regulated company, will face restrictions on the
range of prices that it can offer to customers. Finally, there are
recent results in the revenue management literature [1], which
demonstrate how the assumption of a linear demand model
might be dynamically adapted to price in environments where
the true demand function is nonlinear. The generalization of
such techniques to accommodate the risk-sensitive criteria
considered in this paper (cf. Equation (2)) represents an
interesting direction for future research.
B. Utility Model and Pricing Policies
We consider a setting in which the utility seeks to reduce
its peak electricity demand over multiple days, indexed by t.
Accordingly, we let wt ($/kWh) denote the wholesale price
of electricity during peak demand hours on day t. And, we
let f ($/kWh) denote the retail price of electricity, i.e., the
3fixed price that customers are charged for their electricity
consumption. For the remainder of the paper, it will be
convenient to work with the difference between the wholesale
and retail prices of electricity on each day t, which we denote
by ct := wt − f . We assume throughout the paper that
ct ∈ [0, c] for all days t, where 0 ≤ c < ∞.4 In addition, we
assume that ct is known to the utility prior to its determination
of the DR price pt in each period t. Upon broadcasting a price
pt to its customer base, and realizing an aggregate demand
reduction Dt, the utility derives a net reduction in its peak
electricity cost in the amount of (ct − pt)Dt. Henceforth, we
will refer to the net savings (ct−pt)Dt as the revenue derived
by the utility in period t.
The utility is assumed to be sensitive to risk, in that it would
like to set the price for DR in each period t to maximize the
revenue it is guaranteed to receive with probability no less
than 1 − α. Clearly, the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) encodes the
degree to which the utility is sensitive to risk. Accordingly,
we define the risk-sensitive revenue derived by the utility in
period t given a posted price pt as
rα(pt) := sup {x ∈ R : P{(ct − pt)Dt ≥ x} ≥ 1− α} . (2)
The risk measure specified in (2) is closely related to the stan-
dard concept of value at risk commonly used in mathematical
finance. Conditioned on a fixed price pt, one can reformulate
the expression in (2) as
rα(pt) = (ct − pt)(λ(pt, θ) + F−1(α)), (3)
where F−1(α) := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ α} denotes the α-
quantile of the random variable εt. It is immediate to see from
the simplified expression in (3) that rα(pt) is strictly concave
in pt. Let p
∗
t denote the oracle optimal price, which maximizes
the risk-sensitive revenue in period t. Namely,
p∗t := argmax{rα(pt) : pt ∈ [0, ct]}.
The optimal price is readily derived from the corresponding
first order optimality condition, and is given by
p∗t =
ct
2
− b+ F
−1(α)
2a
.
We define the oracle risk-sensitive revenue accumulated over
T time periods as
R∗(T ) :=
T∑
t=1
rα(p
∗
t ).
The term oracle is used, as R∗(T ) equals the maximum risk-
sensitive revenue achievable by the utility over T periods if it
were to have perfect knowledge of the demand model.
In the setting considered in this paper, we assume that
both the demand model parameters θ = (a, b) and the shock
distribution F are unknown to the utility at the outset. As
a result, the utility must attempt to learn them over time
by observing aggregate demand reductions in response to
4Implicit in this requirement is the assumption that f ≤ wt ≤ c + f for
all days t. The lower bound on wt implies that the utility will only call for
a demand reduction on those days in which the wholesale market manifests
in prices that exceed the fixed retail price for electricity. The upper bound on
wt implies the enforcement of a price cap in the wholesale market.
offered prices. Namely, the utility must endeavor to learn the
demand model, while simultaneously trying to maximize its
risk-sensitive returns over time. As we will later see, such
task will naturally give rise to a trade-off between learning
(exploration) and earning (exploitation) in pricing demand
response over time. First, we describe the space of feasible
pricing policies.
We assume that, prior to its determination of the DR price
in period t, the utility has access to the entire history of prices
and demand reductions until period t−1. We, therefore, define
a feasible pricing policy as an infinite sequence of functions
pi := (p1, p2, . . . ), where each function in the sequence is
allowed to depend only on the past history. More precisely, we
require that the function pt be measurable according to the σ-
algebra generated by the history of past decisions and demand
observations (p1, . . . , pt−1, D1, . . . , Dt−1) for all t ≥ 2, and
that p1 be a deterministic constant. The expected risk-sensitive
revenue generated by a feasible pricing policy pi over T time
periods is defined as
Rpi(T ) := Epi
[
T∑
t=1
rα(pt)
]
,
where expectation is taken with respect to the demand model
(1) under the pricing policy pi.
C. Performance Metric
We evaluate the performance of a feasible pricing policy pi
according to the T -period regret, which we define as
∆pi(T ) := R∗(T )−Rpi(T ).
Naturally, pricing policies yielding a small regret are preferred,
as the oracle risk-sensitive revenue R∗(T ) stands as an upper
bound on the expected risk-sensitive revenue Rpi(T ) achiev-
able by any feasible pricing policy pi. Ultimately, we seek
a pricing policy whose T -period regret is sublinear in the
horizon T . Such a pricing policy is said to have no-regret.
Definition 1 (No Regret Pricing). A feasible pricing policy pi
is said to exhibit no-regret if limT→∞∆
pi(T )/T = 0.
Implicit in the goal of designing a no-regret policy is that
the sequence of prices that it generates should converge to the
oracle optimal price sequence.
III. DEMAND MODEL LEARNING
Clearly, the ability to price with no-regret will rely centrally
on the rate at which the unknown parameters, θ, and quantile
function, F−1(α), can be learned from the market data. In
what follows, we describe a basic approach to learning the
demand model using the method of least squares estimation.
A. Parameter Estimation
Given the history of past decisions and demand observations
(p1, . . . , pt, D1, . . . , Dt) through period t, define the least
squares estimator (LSE) of θ as
θt := argmin
{
t∑
k=1
(Dk − λ(pk, ϑ))2 : ϑ ∈ R2
}
,
4for time periods t = 1, 2, . . . . The LSE at period t admits an
explicit expression of the form
θt =
(
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤)−1( t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
Dk
)
, (4)
provided the indicated inverse exists. It will be convenient to
define the 2× 2 matrix
Jt :=
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
] [
pk
1
]⊤
=
[∑t
k=1 p
2
k
∑t
k=1 pk∑t
k=1 pk t
]
.
Utilizing the definition of the aggregate demand model (1),
in combination with the expression in (4), one can obtain the
following expression for the parameter estimation error:
θt − θ = J −1t
(
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
εk
)
. (5)
Remark 2 (The Role of Price Dispersion). The expression for
the parameter estimation error in (5) reveals how consistency
of the LSE is reliant upon the asymptotic spectrum of the
matrix Jt. Namely, the minimum eigenvalue of Jt, must
grow unbounded with time, in order that the parameter esti-
mation error converge to zero in probability. In [3, Lemma 2],
the authors establish a sufficient condition for such growth.
Specifically, they prove that the minimum eigenvalue of Jt
is bounded from below (up to a multiplicative constant) by the
sum of squared price deviations defined as
Jt :=
t∑
k=1
(pk − pt)2,
where pt := (1/t)
∑t
k=1 pk. The result is reliant on the
assumption that the underlying pricing policy pi yields a
bounded sequence of prices {pt}. An important consequence
of such a result is that it reveals the explicit role that price
dispersion (i.e., exploration) plays in facilitating consistent
parameter estimation.
Finally, given the underlying assumption that the unknown
model parameters θ belong to a compact set defined Θ :=
[a, a] × [0, b], one can improve upon the LSE at time t
by projecting it onto the set Θ. Accordingly, we define the
truncated least squares estimator as
θ̂t := argmin {‖ϑ− θt‖2 : ϑ ∈ Θ} . (6)
Clearly, we have that ‖θ̂t− θ‖2 ≤ ‖θt− θ‖2. In the following
section, we describe an approach to estimating the underlying
quantile function using the parameter estimator defined in (6).
B. Quantile Estimation
Building on the parameter estimator specified in Equa-
tion (6), we construct an estimator of the unknown quantile
function F−1(α) according to the empirical quantile function
associated with the demand estimation residuals. Namely, in
each period t, define the sequence of residuals associated with
the estimator θ̂t as
ε̂k,t := Dk − λ(pk, θ̂t),
for k = 1, . . . , t. Define their empirical distribution as
F̂t(x) :=
1
t
t∑
k=1
1{ε̂k,t ≤ x},
and their corresponding empirical quantile function as
F̂−1t (α) := inf{x ∈ R : F̂t(x) ≥ α} for all α ∈ (0, 1).
It will be useful in the sequel to express the empirical
quantile function in terms of the order statistics associated
with sequence of residuals. Essentially, the order statistics
ε̂(1),t, . . . , ε̂(t),t are defined as a permutation of ε̂1,t, . . . , ε̂t,t
such that ε̂(1),t ≤ ε̂(2),t ≤ · · · ≤ ε̂(t),t. With this concept
in hand, the empirical quantile function can be equivalently
expressed as
F̂−1t (α) = ε̂(i),t, (7)
where the index i is chosen such that i−1t < α ≤ it . It is not
hard to see that i = ⌈tα⌉. Using Equation (7), one can relate
the quantile estimation error to the parameter estimation error
according to the following inequality
|F̂−1t (α)− F−1(α)|
≤ |F−1t (α) − F−1(α)|+
(
1 + p2(i)
)1/2
‖θ̂t − θ‖2,
(8)
where F−1t is defined as the empirical quantile function
associated with the sequence of demand shocks ε1, . . . , εt.
Their empirical distribution is defined as
Ft(x) :=
1
t
t∑
k=1
1{εk ≤ x}.
The inequality in (8) reveals that consistency of the quantile
estimator (7) is reliant upon consistency of the both the pa-
rameter estimator and the empirical quantile function defined
in terms of the sequence of demand shocks. Consistency of the
former is established in Lemma 1 under a suitable choice of a
pricing policy, which we specify in Equation (11). Consistency
of the latter is clearly independent of the choice of pricing
policy. In what follows, we present a bound on the rate of its
convergence in probability.
Proposition 1. Let µ1 := 2/(L
2 log(2)). It holds that
P{|F−1t (α) − F−1(α)| > γ} ≤ 2 exp(−µ1γ2t) (9)
for all γ > 0 and t ≥ 2.
Proposition 1 is similar in nature to [31, Lemma 2], which
provides a bound on the rate at which the empirical distribution
function converges to the true cumulative distribution function
in probability. The combination of Assumption 1 with [31,
Lemma 2] enables the derivation of the upper bound in
Proposition 1.
IV. DESIGN OF PRICING POLICIES
Building on the approach to demand model learning in
Section III, we construct a DR pricing policy, which is
guaranteed to exhibit no-regret.
5A. Myopic Policy
We begin with a description of a natural approach to pricing,
which interleaves the model estimation scheme defined in
Section III with a myopic approach to pricing. That is to say,
at each stage t + 1, the utility estimates the demand model
parameters and quantile function according to (6) and (7),
respectively, and sets the price according to
p̂t+1 =
ct+1
2
− b̂t + F̂
−1
t (α)
2ât
. (10)
Under this pricing policy, the utility essentially treats its model
estimate in each period as if it is correct, and disregards
the subsequent impact of its choice of price on its ability to
accurately estimate the demand model in future time periods.
A danger inherent to a myopic approach to pricing such as
this is that the resulting price sequence may fail to elicit
information from demand at a rate, which is fast enough to
enable consistent model estimation. As a result, the model
estimates may converge to incorrect values. Such behavior is
well documented in the literature [2]–[4], and is commonly
referred to as incomplete learning. In Section VI, we provide
a numerical example, which demonstrates the occurrence of
incomplete learning under the myopic pricing policy (10).
B. Perturbed Myopic Policy
In order to prevent the possibility of incomplete learning, we
propose a pricing policy that is guaranteed to elicit information
from demand at a sufficient rate through carefully designed
perturbations to the myopic pricing policy (10). The pricing
policy we propose is defined as
pt+1 =
{
p̂t+1, t odd
p̂t +
1
2 (ct+1 − ct) + ρδt+1, t even,
(11)
where ρ ≥ 0 is a user specified positive constant, and
δt := sgn (ct − ct−1) · t−1/4.
We refer to the policy (11) as the perturbed myopic policy.5
The perturbed myopic policy differs from the myopic policy
in two important ways. First, the model parameter estimate, θ̂t,
and quantile estimate, F̂−1t (α), are updated at every other time
step. Second, to enforce sufficient price exploration, an offset
is added to the myopic price at every other time step. Roughly
speaking, the sequence of myopic price offsets {ρδt} is chosen
to decay at a rate, which is slow enough to ensure consistent
model learning, but not so slow as to preclude a sub-linear
growth rate for regret. In Section V, we will show that the
combination of these features is enough to ensure consistent
parameter estimation and a sub-linear growth rate for the T -
period regret, which is bounded from above byO(
√
T log(T )).
Remark 3 (On the Perturbation Order). We briefly describe
the rationale behind the selection of the order of the perturba-
tion sequence as δt = O(t
−1/4). First, notice from Equation
(12) that the regret incurred by any feasible pricing policy is
equal to the sum of the squared pricing errors generated by
5In defining the sign function, we require that sgn(0) = 1.
the policy. Combining this expression with the upper bound
on the absolute pricing error induced by the perturbed myopic
policy in (14), it becomes clear to see the conflicting effects
that the perturbation sequence has on regret. On the one hand,
an increase in the order of the perturbation sequence will tend
to reduce the growth rate of regret by increasing the rate at
which the parameter estimation error ‖θ̂t − θ‖2 converges
to zero. On the other hand, an increase in the order of the
perturbation sequence will tend to have the counterproductive
effect of increasing the growth rate of regret by increasing the
rate at which the deliberate pricing errors ρ|δt| accumulate.
A tradeoff, therefore, emerges in selecting the order of the
perturbation sequence. In Appendix B, we show that among all
perturbation sequences that are polynomial in t, perturbation
sequences of the order O(t−1/4) are optimal in the sense of
minimizing the asymptotic order of our upper bound on regret
(ignoring logarithmic factors).
V. A BOUND ON REGRET
Given the demand model considered in this paper, one can
express the T -period regret as
∆pi(T ) = a
T∑
t=1
E
pi
[
(pt − p∗t )2
]
, (12)
under any pricing policy pi. It becomes apparent, upon exam-
ination of Equation (12), that the rate at which regret grows
is directly proportional to the rate at which pricing errors
accumulate. We, therefore, proceed in deriving a bound on
the rate at which the absolute pricing error |pt−p∗t | converges
to zero in probability, under the perturbed myopic policy.
First, it is not difficult to show that, under the perturbed
myopic policy (11), the absolute pricing error incurred in each
even time period t is upper bounded by
|pt+1 − p∗t+1| (13)
≤ κ1‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖2 + κ2|F̂−1t−1(α) − F−1(α)| + ρ|δt+1|,
where κ1 := (a
2 +(b+ ε)2)1/2/(2a2) and κ2 := 1/(2a). The
pricing error incurred during odd time periods t is similarly
bounded, sans the explicit dependency on the myopic price
perturbation. The upper bound in (13) is intuitive as it consists
of three terms: the parameter estimation error, the quantile
estimation error, and the myopic price perturbation – each of
which represents a rudimentary source of pricing error.
One can further refine the upper bound in (13), by lever-
aging on the fact that, under the perturbed myopic policy, the
generated sequence of prices is uniformly bounded. That is to
say, |pt| ≤ p for all time periods t, where
p :=
1
2
max
{
c− ε
a
, c− ε
a
,
b+ ε
a
}
.
Combining this fact with the previously derived upper bound
on the quantile estimation error in (8), we have that
|pt+1 − p∗t+1| (14)
≤ κ3‖θ̂t−1 − θ‖2 + κ2|F−1t−1(α) − F−1(α)| + ρ|δt+1|,
for even time periods t, where κ3 := κ1 + κ2(1 + p
2)1/2.
6Consistency of the perturbed myopic policy depends on the
asymptotic behavior of each term in (14). The price perturba-
tion converges to zero by construction, and consistency of the
empirical quantile function is established in Proposition 1. The
following Lemma establishes a bound on the mean squared
parameter estimation error under the perturbed myopic policy
(11).
Lemma 1 (Consistent Parameter Estimation). There exists
a finite positive constant µ2 such that, under the perturbed
myopic policy (11),
E
[
‖θ̂t − θ‖2
]
≤ µ2
ρ2
log(t)√
t
,
for all t ≥ 3 and ρ > 0.
The following Theorem establishes an O(
√
T log(T )) upper
bound on the T -period regret.
Theorem 1 (Sub-linear Regret). The T -period regret incurred
by the perturbed myopic policy (11) satisfies
∆pi(T ) ≤ C0 + C1
√
T log(T ) + C2 log(T ), (15)
for all T ≥ 3. Here, C0, C1, and C2 are finite positive
constants.6
In the process of proving Theorem 1, we also show that
the perturbed myopic policy generates a sequence of market
prices {pt} that converges to the oracle optimal price sequence
{p∗t} in the mean square sense. More formally, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Price Consistency). The sequence of prices {pt}
generated by the perturbed myopic policy (11) satisfies
lim
t→∞
E
[
(pt − p∗t )2
]
= 0,
where {p∗t} denotes the oracle optimal price sequence.
A. The Exploratory Effect of Wholesale Price Variation
Thus far in this paper, we have made no assumption on
the nature of variation in the sequence of wholesale electricity
prices {wt}. In particular, all of the previously stated results
hold for any sequence of time-varying wholesale electricity
prices. This includes the special case in which the wholesale
price of electricity is constant across time, i.e., wt = w for all
time periods t. It is, however, natural to inquire as to how the
degree of variation in the sequence of wholesale prices might
impact the performance of the pricing policies considered in
this paper.
First, it is straightforward to see from Equation (10) that
variation in the sequence of wholesale prices induces equiva-
lent variation in the sequence of myopic prices. Such variation
in the myopic price sequence is most naturally interpreted as
a form of costless exploration. In the following result, we
establish a sufficient condition on the variation of wholesale
prices, which eliminates the need for external perturbations
to the myopic price sequence (i.e., setting ρ = 0), while
6We refer the reader to Equations (34) -(36) for the exact specification of
the coefficients C0, C1, and C2.
guaranteeing an upper bound on the resulting T -period regret
that is O(log2(T )).
Theorem 2 (Logarithmic Regret). Assume that there exists a
finite positive constant σ > 0 such that
|wt − wt−1| ≥ σ, (16)
for all time periods t.7 It follows that the T -period regret
incurred by the perturbed myopic policy (11), with ρ = 0,
satisfies
∆pi(T ) ≤M0 + M2
σ2
+M1 log(T ) +
M2
σ2
log2(T ), (17)
for all T ≥ 3. Here, M0,M1, and M2 are finite positive
constants8, which are independent of the parameter σ.
Several comments are in order. First, under the additional
assumption of persistent wholesale price variation (16), we
establish in Theorem 2 an improvement upon the original
order of regret stated in Theorem 1 from O(
√
T log(T )) to
O(log2(T )). However, as one might expect, the magnitude of
the upper bound on regret in (17) scales in a manner that is
inversely proportional to σ2. As a result, the upper bound on
the T -period regret goes to infinity as σ goes to zero, and,
therefore, provides little useful information when σ is small.
VI. CASE STUDY
We conduct a numerical analysis to compare the perfor-
mance of the myopic policy (10) against the perturbed myopic
policy (11) over a time horizon of T = 104. We set the tuning
parameter ρ = 0.19. We consider the setting in which there
are N = 1000 customers participating in the DR program. For
each customer i, we select ai uniformly at random from the
interval [0.04, 0.20], and independently select bi according an
exponential distribution (with mean equal to 0.01) truncated
over interval [0, 0.1]. Parameters are drawn independently
across customers.9 For each customer i, we take the demand
shock to be distributed according to a normal distribution with
zero-mean and standard deviation equal to 0.04, truncated
over the interval [−0.4, 0.4]. We consider a utility with risk
sensitivity equal to α = 0.1. In other words, the utility seeks
to maximize the revenue it is guaranteed to receive with
probability no less than 0.9. Finally, we set the retail price
of electricity to f = 0.17 ($/kWh), and set the wholesale
price of electricity to wt = 1.67 ($/kWh) for all days t. Such
values are consistent with the average residential retail and
peak wholesale prices of electricity in the state of New York
in 2016 [34], [35].
A. Discussion
Because the wholesale price of electricity is fixed over
time, the parameter and quantile estimates represent the only
7Note that Assumption (16) in Theorem 2 implies that |ct − ct−1| ≥ σ.
8We refer the reader to Equations (37) -(39) for the exact specification of
the coefficients M0,M1, and M2.
9It is worth noting that the range of parameter values ai ∈ [0.04, 0.20]
considered in this numerical study is consistent with the range of demand
price elasticities observed in several real-time pricing programs conducted in
the United States [32], [33].
7source of variation in the sequence of prices generated by the
myopic policy. Due to the combined structure of the myopic
policy and the least squares estimator, the value of each new
demand observation rapidly diminishes over time, which, in
turn, manifests in a rapid convergence of the sequence of
prices generated under the myopic policy. The resulting lack of
exploration in the sequence of myopic prices results in incom-
plete learning, which is seen in Figure 1. Namely, the sequence
of myopic prices converges to a value, which substantially
differs form the oracle optimal price. As a consequence, the
myopic policy incurs a T -period regret that grows linearly with
the horizon T , as is observed in Figure 2.
On the other hand, the sequence of perturbations {ρδt}
generate enough variation in the sequence of prices generated
by the perturbed myopic policy to ensure consistent model
estimation, as is seen in Figures 1a and 1b. This, in turn,
results in convergence of the sequence of posted prices to the
oracle optimal price. This, combined with the fact that the
price offset ρδt vanishes at a sufficiently fast rate, ensures
sublinearity in the growth rate of the corresponding T -period
regret, as is observed in Figure 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a data-driven approach to pricing
demand response with the aim of maximizing the risk-sensitive
revenue derived by the electric power utility. The perturbed
myopic pricing policy we propose has two key features.
First, the unknown demand model parameters are estimated
using a least squares estimator. Second, the proposed policy
implements a sequence of perturbations to the myopic price
sequence to ensure sufficient exploration in the sequence of
prices it generates. The price perturbation sequence is designed
to decay at a rate, which is slow enough to ensure complete
learning of the underlying demand model, but not so slow as
to preclude a sub-linear growth rate for regret. In particular,
the proposed pricing policy is proven to exhibit a T -period
regret that is no greater than O(
√
T log(T )). As a direction
for future research, it would be interesting to investigate the
generalization of the pricing algorithms developed in this paper
to accommodate the treatment of nonlinear and possibly time-
varying demand functions.
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APPENDIX
In the following proofs, we consider a more general form
of the perturbation as δt = sgn(ct − ct−1) · t−r, where r is
allowed to be an arbitrary constant in the interval [0, 1/2).
Ultimately, we will prove that a choice of r = 1/4 minimizes
the asymptotic order of the upper bound on regret (ignoring
logarithmic factors), which we establish in (32).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The parameter estimation error derived in Equation (5) is
given by
θt − θ = J −1t ε˜t,
where ε˜t is defined as
ε˜t =
t∑
k=1
[
pk
1
]
εk.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and assuming that Jt is
invertible, the 2-norm of parameter estimation error is bounded
as follows.
‖θt − θ‖2 = ‖J −1t ε˜t‖2 ≤ ‖J −1/2t ‖2‖J −1/2t ε˜t‖2.
Using the definition of matrix norms, we get
‖J −1/2t ‖2 =
(
λmax(J
−1/2
t )
)2
=
1
λmin(Jt)
,
where the operators λmax and λmin denote the largest and the
smallest eigenvalues, respectively. In the following Lemma, we
establish a lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of Jt in
terms of the price perturbations and the wholesale energy price
variations.
9Lemma 2. Under the perturbed myopic policy (11), it holds
that
λmin(Jt) ≥ 1
1 + p2
Lt a.s., (18)
where Lt is defined as
Lt :=
1
8
ρ2⌊t/2⌋1−2r + ⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
(c2k − c2k−1)2
 . (19)
Using Inequality (18), the mean squared parameter estima-
tion error can be bounded as
E
[‖θt − θ‖2] ≤ E [ 1
λmin(Jt)
‖J −1/2t ε˜t‖2
]
≤ 1 + p
2
Lt
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
. (20)
We now establish an upper bound on E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
by adopt-
ing a similar approach as [36, Lemma 1]. More specifically,
we establish a recursive inequality relating E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
to
E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t−1ε˜t−1
]
. It holds that
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
= E
[(
ε˜t−1 +
[
pt
1
]
εt
)⊤
J −1t
(
ε˜t−1 +
[
pt
1
]
εt
)]
= E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t ε˜t−1
]
+ 2E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t
[
pt
1
]
εt
]
+ E
[[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]
ε2t
]
. (21)
Using the fact that ε˜t−1, pt, and Jt are all measurable
according to the σ-algebra generated by ε1, . . . , εt−1, and the
law of iterated expectations, we get
E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t
[
pt
1
]
εt
]
= E
[
E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t
[
pt
1
]
εt
∣∣∣∣ε1, . . . , εt−1]]
= E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t
[
pt
1
]
E
[
εt
∣∣ε1, . . . , εt−1]]
= 0, (22)
where the last identity follows from the fact that εt is in-
dependent of ε1, . . . , εt−1 and is zero-mean. Using a similar
argument, we get
E
[[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]
ε2t
]
= E
[[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]]
E
[
ε2t
]
≤ E
[[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]]
(ε− ε)2
4
,
(23)
where the last inequality follows from Popoviciu’s inequality
on variances. By combining Equations (21) and (22) with
Inequality (23), we get
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
(24)
≤ E [ε˜⊤t−1J −1t ε˜t−1]+ E
[[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]]
(ε− ε)2
4
.
Here, we bound each term in the right hand side of Inequality
(24) separately. For the first term, using the Sherman-Morrison
formula, we get
J −1t =
(
Jt−1 +
[
pt
1
] [
pt
1
]⊤)−1
= J −1t−1 −
J −1t−1
[
pt
1
] [
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t−1
1 +
[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t−1
[
pt
1
] .
Thus,
E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t ε˜t−1
]
= E
[
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t−1ε˜t−1
]− E

(
ε˜⊤t−1J
−1
t−1
[
pt
1
])2
1 +
[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t−1
[
pt
1
]

≤ E [ε˜⊤t−1J −1t−1ε˜t−1] , (25)
where the equality follows from the fact that the random
variable in the second expectation is non-negative almost
surely.
For the second term in Inequality (24), we have that[
pt
1
]⊤
J −1t
[
pt
1
]
=
1
Jt
[
pt
1
]⊤ [
1 −p¯t
−p¯t (1/t)
∑t
k=1 p
2
k
] [
pt
1
]
=
1
Jt
(
(pt − p¯t)2 + 1
t
Jt
)
=
Jt − Jt−1
Jt
+
1
t
, (26)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Jt−Jt−1 =
(pt− p¯t)2. Now using Inequalities (24), (25), and (26) we get
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
≤ E [ε˜⊤t−1J −1t−1ε˜t−1]+ (Jt − Jt−1Jt + 1t
)
(ε− ε)2
4
.
By summing both sides of the above inequality from 3 to t
we get
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
]
≤ E [ε˜⊤2 J −12 ε˜2]+ (ε− ε)24 E
[
t∑
k=3
(
Jk − Jk−1
Jk
+
1
k
)]
.
It is straightforward to show that
E
[
ε˜⊤2 J
−1
2 ε˜2
]
= E
[
ε21 + ε
2
2
] ≤ 1
2
(ε− ε)2.
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Note that
∑t
k=3(1/k) ≤ log(t). We also have that
t∑
k=3
Jk − Jk−1
Jk
=
t∑
k=3
∫ Jk
Jk−1
dx
Jk
≤
t∑
k=3
∫ Jk
Jk−1
dx
x
=
∫ Jt
J2
dx
x
≤ log(Jt)
≤ log(tp2),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (pk−p¯t)2 ≤
p2 almost surely. Finally, we get
E
[
ε˜⊤t J
−1
t ε˜t
] ≤ 1
2
(ε− ε)2 (1 + log(p¯) + log(t))
≤ 1
2
(ε− ε)2 (2 + log(p¯)) log(t),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that log(t) ≥ 1
for t ≥ 3. Finally, by applying the above inequality to the
bound on the mean squared parameter estimation error (20),
we get
E
[‖θt − θ‖2] ≤ 1
2
(1 + p2)(ε− ε)2 (2 + log(p¯)) log(t)
Lt
.
(27)
To complete the proof, we set r = 1/4. For this choice of r,
we have that Lt ≥ ρ2
√
⌊t/2⌋/8 ≥ ρ2√t/16. Setting µ2 :=
8(1 + p2)(ε− ε)2 (2 + log(p¯)) concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We introduce an additional assumption on the variation in
the sequence of wholesale electricity prices.10 Namely, let σ ≥
0 be nonnegative constant such that |ct − ct−1| ≥ σ for all
t ≥ 1. Ultimately, we will establish the desired result for σ =
0, the setting considered in the statement of the Theorem.
We begin with the following upper bound on the T -period
regret.
∆pi(T ) = a
T∑
t=1
E
[
(pt − p∗t )2
]
≤ a
⌊T+1
2
⌋∑
t=1
E
[
(p̂2t−1 − p∗2t−1)2 + (p̂2t−1 − p∗2t−1 + ρδ2t)2
]
≤ a
⌊T+1
2
⌋∑
t=1
(
3E
[
(p̂2t−1 − p∗2t−1)2
]
+ 2ρ2δ22t
)
= K0 + 2aρ
2
⌊ T+1
2
⌋∑
t=1
(2t)−2r + 3a
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
E
[
(p̂2t+1 − p∗2t+1)2
]
,
(28)
10Such assumption will prove useful in facilitating the proof of Theorem
2.
where the second inequality follows from the fact that x2 +
(x+ y)2 ≤ 3x2 + 2y2 for any pair of scalars x, y ∈ R. Here,
the constant K0 is defined as
K0 = 3a(p1 − p∗1)2.
Recall that p1 is assumed to be a deterministic constant. We
now establish upper bounds on each term of the bound (28)
separately.
Second term: For all T ≥ 3, we have that
⌊T+1
2
⌋∑
t=1
(2t)−2r ≤
∫ ⌊T+1
2
⌋
0
(2t)−2rdt
=
1
2(1− 2r)
(
2
⌊
T + 1
2
⌋)1−2r
≤ 2
3(1− 2r)T
1−2r, (29)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
(T+1T )
1−2r ≤ 4/3 for all T ≥ 3 and all r ∈ [0, 1/2).
Third term: Using the upper bound on the pricing error
(14), we get
(p̂2t+1 − p∗2t+1)2 ≤ 2κ23‖θ̂2t − θ‖2 + 2κ22(F−12t (α) − F−1(α))2.
Then,
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
E
[
(p̂2t+1 − p∗2t+1)2
]
≤
⌊ T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
E
[
2κ23‖θ̂2t − θ‖2 + 2κ22(F−12t (α) − F−1(α))2
]
≤
⌊ T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
(
κ4
log(2t)
L2t
+ 2κ22E
[
(F−12t (α) − F−1(α))2
])
,
(30)
where the last inequality follows from the upper bound
(27) on the mean squared parameter estimation error and
κ4 := (1 + p
2)(ε − ε)2 (2 + log(p¯))κ23. Using the fact that
for a continuous nonnegative random variable X , it holds that
E[X ] =
∫∞
0
P{X ≥ x}dx, we get
E
[
(F−12t (α)−F−1(α))2
]
=
∫ ∞
0
P{(F−12t (α)−F−1(α))2 ≥ γ}dγ
≤
∫ ∞
0
2 exp(−µ1γ(2t))dγ
=
1
µ1t
, (31)
where the inequality follows from the bound (9). By combin-
ing Inequalities (28), (29), (30), and (31), we get
∆pi(T )
≤ K0 + 4a
3(1− 2r)ρ
2T 1−2r + 3a
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
(
κ4
log(2t)
L2t
+
2κ22
µ1t
)
≤ K0 + 4a
3(1− 2r)ρ
2T 1−2r + 24aκ4
⌊ T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
log(2t)
ρ2t1−2r + σ2t
+
6aκ22
µ1
(1 + log(T )), (32)
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where the last inequality follows from the definition of L2t in
Equation (19) and the assumption that |ct − ct−1| ≥ σ for all
t. For σ = 0, it is straightforward to show that a choice of r =
1/4 minimizes the asymptotic order of the upper bound (32)
with respect to the horizon T up to multiplicative logarithmic
factors. Setting r = 1/4 and σ = 0 yields
∆pi(T ) ≤ K1 +K2 log(T ) +K3ρ2
√
T +
K4
ρ2
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
log(2t)√
t
,
(33)
where K1 := K0 + K2, K2 := 6aκ
2
2/µ1, K3 := 8a/3, and
K4 := 24aκ4. It holds that
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
log(2t)√
t
≤ log(2) +
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=2
log(2t)√
t
≤ log(2) +
∫ T/2
1
log(2t)√
t
dt
≤ log(2) + 2
√
T
2
log (T ) .
Finally, we define the nonnegative constants C0, C1, and C2
as follows to conclude the proof.
C0 := K1 +
K4 log(2)
ρ2
(34)
C1 :=
√
2K4
ρ2
+K3ρ
2 (35)
C2 := K2. (36)
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Inequality (32) is a valid upper bound on the T -period regret
incurred by perturbed myopic policy, under the assumption
that σ > 0. By setting ρ = 0, the upper bound simplifies to
∆pi(T ) ≤ K0 + 24aκ4
⌊T+1
2
⌋−1∑
t=1
log(2t)
σ2t
+
6aκ22
µ1
(1 + log(T )),
It holds that
T/2∑
t=1
log(2t)
t
≤ log(2) +
∫ T/2
1
log(2t)
t
dt ≤ log(2) + log2(T ).
We define the nonnegative constants M0, M1, and M2 as
follows to conclude the proof.
M0 := K0 +M1 (37)
M1 :=
6aκ22
µ1
(38)
M2 := 24aκ4. (39)
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It is straightforward to show that the characteristic polyno-
mial of Jt is given by
λ2 − λ
(
t+
t∑
k=1
p2k
)
+ tJt = 0.
Then,
λmax(Jt) + λmin(Jt) = t+
t∑
k=1
p2k,
λmax(Jt)λmin(Jt) = tJt.
From the first identity it follows that
λmax(Jt) ≤ t+
t∑
k=1
p2k ≤ t(1 + p2).
Thus, we get
λmin(Jt) =
tJt
λmax(Jt)
≥ Jt
1 + p2
.
We now bound the random process {Jt} from below by a
deterministic sequence. Fix t. A direct substitution of the
perturbed myopic policy yields
Jt ≥
⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
{
(p̂2k−1 − p¯t)2
+
(
p̂2k−1 − p¯t + 1
2
(c2k − c2k−1) + ρδ2k
)2}
.
The above inequality can be further relaxed to eliminate its
explicit dependency on the (random) price process. Namely,
it is straightforward to show that
Jt ≥ 1
2
⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
ρ2
(2k)2r
+
1
8
⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
(c2k − c2k−1)2 . (40)
One can further relax inequality (40) by using the facts that
t∑
k=1
1
k2r
≥
∫ t+1
1
1
x2r
dx =
(t+ 1)1−2r − 1
1− 2r ,
and
(t+ 1)1−2r − 1 ≥ t1−2r
(
1− 1
21−2r
)
.
It follows that
Jt ≥ ρ
2
21+2r
⌊t/2⌋1−2r
1− 2r
(
1− 1
21−2r
)
+
1
8
⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
(c2k − c2k−1)2
≥ Lt, (41)
where Lt is defined as
Lt :=
1
8
ρ2⌊t/2⌋1−2r + ⌊t/2⌋∑
k=1
(c2k − c2k−1)2
 .
